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ABSTRACT

This paper argues for two major changes in the selection of students and in the way that services are delivered under Chapter 1 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981. The first change would make available Chapter 1 funds only to schools with very high proportions of children whose families live in poverty. The second change would encourage the use of Chapter 1 funds in school-wide programs to augment and improve the quality of the regular school program in these high poverty schools. There are four sections to this paper. The first sketches general premises which help lead to the two sets of recommendations. The second considers the question of who should be served, and the third section addresses the various kinds of services that should be offered. The final section summarizes the key recommendations and the rationales for the recommendations. The paper incorporates critical reactions to the research papers written for the conference session on student selection and services and draws extensively on other research. Endnotes and references are included. (PS)

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SELECTING STUDENTS AND SERVICES FOR CHAPTER 1: REACTIONS

by

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SELECTING STUDENTS AND SERVICES FOR
CHAPTER 1: REACTIONS

This paper addresses two central questions in the design of the program of Chapter 1 of the Educational Consolidation and Improvement Act: How should students be selected to receive services and what kinds of services should be delivered by the program? As part of the discussion of these questions, a few comments are made about the two excellent papers prepared for this session, "Poverty, Achievement and the Distribution of Compensatory Education Services" by Kennedy, Jung, and Orland and "Selecting Students and Services for Compensatory Education: Lessons from Aptitude-Treatment Interaction Research" by Peterson.

This paper argues for two major changes in the selection of students and in the way that services are delivered in the Chapter 1 program. The first change would target Chapter 1 funds only to schools with very high proportions of children whose families live in poverty. The second change would encourage the use of Chapter 1 funds in school-wide programs to augment and improve the quality of the regular school program in these high poverty schools. Each of the changes can be generated through alterations in the Chapter 1 legislation. Although a compelling case can be made for both sets of changes, each would spark considerable political and substantive debate partly because each alters the distribution of resources.

There are four sections to this paper. The first sketches general premises which help lead to the two sets of recommendations. The second considers the question of who should be served and the third section addresses what kinds of services should be offered? The final section summarizes the key recommendations and the rationales for the recommendations.

Premises

Six general and interrelated premises influence my thinking about Chapter 1. They and some of their implications for the program are summarized below.

1. For twenty years Chapter 1 and its predecessor, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, have served as a powerful symbol of the intent of the Federal government and the nation as a whole to provide equal educational opportunity to poor children (Smith, 1984; Kaestle & Smith,

1982). This argues that it would be a major mistake to eliminate or even reduce the program.

2. Chapter 1 programs have been implemented primarily at the elementary school level in grades K-6. The overwhelming percentage of the programs have focused on improving the reading and mathematics achievement of low-achieving students. Clear data from a number of sources show that Chapter 1 programs, on the average, have had only modest short-term and no long-term sustained effects on the reading and mathematics achievement of targeted students (Kennedy et al., 1986; Kaestle & Smith, 1982; Wang, Bear, Conklin, & Hoepfner, 1981; Kenoyer, Cooper, Saxton, & Hoepfner, 1981; Hoepfner, 1981; Rogers, Landers, & Hoepfner, 1982). Over the years Chapter 1 has changed in a variety of marginal ways, yet the general conclusions about overall effectiveness have not changed. These findings suggest that further tinkering at the margins of the program will have little likelihood of producing major improvement in its overall effectiveness. Major changes in the program might be necessary to measurably improve its performance.

3. Our understanding of how to deliver effective educational services to poor children has changed dramatically since 1965 when Title I was first authorized and since 1972-1976 when the legislative framework was fully established. We have new knowledge about how students learn, about the nature and content of effective instruction, about the characteristics of effective schools, and about the implementation of educational reform. This new understanding has important implications for the selection of students and the delivery of services (Peterson, 1986; Romberg, 1986; Calfee, 1986; Hallinan, 1986; Brophy, 1986). In a substantial number of ways Chapter 1 rules and regulations make it difficult to put this new knowledge into use. There are clear directions for major changes in the program, and there is considerable promise for improving the way that Chapter 1/ Title I programs are delivered and implemented.

4. Poverty has a substantial and pervasive effect on the individuals in poverty and on the society as a whole. Although many children in poverty do very well in school, there is a robust relationship between the achievement of a child and the level of resources that the child's family can afford. This relationship is especially strong for children in families

which are in poverty over substantial periods of time. Moreover, there appears to be an independent and negative effect on a student's achievement of a high density of poor children in the student's neighborhood and school. Finally, the number of poor children in the nation is increasing, poor children are found in disproportionate numbers in minority groups which continue to suffer from significant discrimination in the society, and there seems to be an increasing concentration of poor and minority group children in the inner cities of the United States (Kennedy et al., 1986; Kaestle & Smith, 1982; Levin, 1985, 1986). There is a special need for Chapter 1 funding in districts and schools with very high densities of poor children. These are typically inner-city and poor rural areas.

5. Over the past 15 years there has been some improvement in the reading and mathematics achievement of minority and poor students relative to the achievement of middle-income youngsters. By some estimates the gap between the two groups in the elementary and middle grades has closed by upwards of 25 percent. This very encouraging sign suggests that further attention to the problem will yield benefits. Yet, the gap has closed by less in the later grades, and there appears to be some decline on measures of higher-order academic skills. The effect on early achievement may be due in part to the symbolic effect of Chapter 1 but does not seem to be directly due to the effects of the program (Kennedy et al., 1986; Peterson, 1986). Alternative, plausible reasons are the effects of desegregation (particularly in the South) and the multiple attempts at school reform in the cities--reform which has operated independently of Title I (Koretz, 1986; Levin, 1986).[1] The lack of a clear achievement effect in later grades is mirrored by depressingly high (upwards of 40-50 percent) and, by some reports, increasing dropout rates (since 1974) for poor and especially Black and Hispanic groups in the cities.[2] This effect may be related to the relative degree of inattention given to the middle and high school years by education reformers in the 70s and early 80s, to the increasing degree of inequality of family incomes in the society within the Black and White populations which is reflected in an increasing concentration of the poor in the cities, and to the lack of clear rewards (such as jobs) that would result to poor and minority students as a consequence of their graduating from high school (Kennedy et al., 1986; Levin, 1985, 1986).[3] Thus, Chapter 1, if changed in a way that

would promote positive effects, could be especially useful in middle and secondary schools as well as elementary schools.

6. The status of the poor and minorities in the society and the quality and equality of the educational opportunities of their children will not be fully resolved by changes to the educational system—increased job opportunities and public commitment to the eradication of poverty are required. Yet recent data indicate that the quality of education has a substantial impact on the life chances of students.[4] It appears clear from past data summarized above, that marginal changes in the quality of education will not have a great effect on the opportunities of poor and minority students. Major, systematic change to our educational programs for the poor is necessary to meet a social goal of equal educational opportunity.

Who Should Be Served by Chapter 1?

A substantial part of the Kennedy et al. paper deals with the technical and substantive sides of this question. It does not consider, however, the normative and political sides of the issue. Congress decides who should receive the services of Chapter 1 after members have reviewed data on the past successes and failures of the program, weighed information about the needs of students and educational systems throughout the nation and about ways of improving educational opportunity and quality, and made political judgments based on their own experiences and sets of values and the pressures brought to bear on them by their political friends and enemies.

The weight of this process is heavy on the side of making few significant changes in existing legislation even when the data show that the program has only minor overall effects. Major change generally creates a situation where some of the present "winners" lose resources unless the overall pool of resources is dramatically increased, an unlikely prospect. Since those presently receiving resources know they have a stake, they mount pressure to justify the present system and suppress significant change. Local constituent groups make cogent arguments based on the facts that, if there were to be major change, many effective programs would lose funding and considerable educational and personal disruption would occur. With literally tens of thousands of separate Chapter 1 programs in schools, there are hundreds of very productive ones, even though the average effect of all of the programs is minuscule.

Another force that protects programs is a coalition of dedicated staff of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the educational associations based in Washington. For Chapter 1, this group is reinforced by many of the Civil Rights organizations. A great number of the people in these organizations have fought for the rights of children for 20 years and see any suggestion of change in Chapter 1 as a direct attack on the concept of equal educational opportunity.[5]

A major goal of many of these groups in the past has been to reduce the chances for significant change to occur in this 20-year-old, relatively stable, and now, unthreatening program. It may be, however, that the accumulation of new knowledge about effective educational practice and the present spirit of educational reform have altered the odds for major change in the way the Federal government and the nation as a whole provides educational services for poor children. It should be possible to change direction in a program if it can be cogently shown that the present system is ineffective and inefficient and that there are plausible alternative approaches that promise greater effectiveness and efficiency. The first section of this paper touched on the issue of the effectiveness of the current program and argued that its value was largely in its symbolism. The argument that effectiveness can be improved is addressed in the next section of this paper in the discussion of the nature of the services. In the remainder of this section I consider the issue of efficiency. I will argue that the present allocation system necessarily leads to an inefficient distribution of resources to meet the needs of poor, low-achieving students and that the data presented by Kennedy et al. document this inefficiency and suggest a more efficient allocation system.

In their paper Kennedy et al. review the legislative intent and the current legislation and regulations that guide the Federal, state, local, and school-level allocation of resources. They also review data on the relationship between poverty (individual and collective) and achievement as part of their assessment of the validity of the framework. To develop an argument for altering the present allocation strategy, it is necessary to review both the present framework and the evidence amassed by Kennedy and her colleagues.

The legislative declaration of policy that has driven Chapter 1 for two decades "recognizes the special educational needs of children from low-income families and the impact that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of local educational agencies to support adequate educational programs" and calls for it to be a "policy of the United States to provide financial assistance to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve their educational programs by

various means which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.[6] To meet this policy, Congress over the years has developed and occasionally modified a variety of more explicit legislative language. In response to the language of the law, the administrative branch of the government (first the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and now the Department of Education) has developed extensive regulations and other administrative, sub-regulatory guidance for states and local education agencies. In brief, Chapter 1 funds[7] are allocated in the following fashion:

- The total appropriation for the basic grants program is distributed among states and then within states to counties proportionally to the number of youth aged 5-17 who are in families that fall under the poverty guidelines. The number of poor youth in the various counties (and hence aggregated to states) is estimated using the most recent census. There is some adjustment made for the number of youth in families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children.[8]

- Within counties, funds are distributed to local education agencies generally in proportion to the number of poverty students, usually measured by eligibility for free lunch.

- Within local education agencies (LEAs), funds are distributed to schools according to a flexible set of guidelines. In general, LEAs have the authority to select grade levels to be targeted and to specify the goals and magnitude of programs within the following kinds of constraints: schools must be selected in order on the basis of their percentages of poverty students (free lunch eligibility is usually used as the poverty measure) with the greatest poverty schools within a district receiving first priority; at least one-half of all schools within a district and any school that has a poverty percentage of at least 25 percent is eligible. After the selection of grade levels, schools are often stratified into elementary, middle and secondary before the other rules are applied.[9]

- After a school have been selected and the nature of the program and grade levels decided on, students are chosen to participate in the program. The legislation and regulations require that the lowest achieving students be selected. Most school and LEAs use standardized achievement tests (and often other means) to assess potentially eligible students in appropriate areas, such as reading or mathematics.

The number of students selected depends on the size and nature of the Chapter 1 program, though in general the regulations require that the poorest schools have the largest programs.

The Kennedy et al. paper presents a variety of interesting data that generally support two basic assumptions of the legislation and that are reflected to some degree in the allocation system: that family poverty, especially long-term poverty, is clearly associated with low student achievement, and that schools and communities with strong concentrations of poverty have an added negative effect on student achievement above and beyond the student's individual family status.[10] A major contribution of their paper is to document the argument that students from low-income families who live in areas with a high concentration of other poor families have a double dose of disadvantage: their families are unable to give them certain advantages that other students have, and their schools, for a variety of reasons, are not as able to aid them in achieving academic success as schools with an affluent student body. Moreover, poor students in these areas (the inner-cities and poor rural areas) are more likely to be in families which are in long-term poverty; these students are more likely to be low-achievers than students who are only temporarily in poverty and are more likely to require long-term attention.

Yet, while the legislation and regulations generally reflect this logic, the data on the distribution of Chapter 1 resources indicate that there is a lot of slippage.[11] With a small exception little special treatment is given in the legislation or the regulations to areas with a high concentration of poor children; in the distribution of over 90 percent of the funds a poor child in an affluent LEA counts as much in the allocation system as a poor child in the inner-city or in the poorest county of Kentucky.[12] And, no special provision is made for children in long-term poverty. The provisions that allocate the funds to states and to counties and finally to LEAs spread the money very thinly to almost all of the 14,000 separate local educational agencies in the nation. Thus, in almost all school districts with only one school in total or only one elementary and one secondary school, there is a Chapter 1 program serving elementary pupils. In larger districts, the regulations allow the Chapter 1 program to serve at least 50 percent of the schools serving the selected grade levels. In most communities the politics of the distribution of resources requires the administrators and school board to spread the funds out as much as possible. Overall, Kennedy et al. estimate that 70 percent of all elementary schools in the nation have a Chapter 1 program. This is tragically inadequate targeting for a program intended to reach low-scoring students in high poverty schools.[13]

The actual application of the rules and regulations also leads to situations which clearly go against the philosophy of the program. Let me give two not extreme examples. In Madison, Wisconsin, a city that spends over $5,000 per pupil and has an average elementary class size of under 23 students, there are Chapter 1 programs in schools which are in the 70th achievement percentile of all schools in the nation. Contrast the need in these schools with that in the hundreds of inner-city middle and secondary schools that average in the bottom quartile of achievement and that graduate under 60 percent of their students but do not have a Chapter 1 program because there are insufficient funds in these cities to serve middle and secondary schools. In suburban systems throughout the nation there are schools with 10 percent or less of the student body in poverty receiving funds because they are in the top half of the schools in their system in poverty percentage, while in city schools throughout the nation there are schools with considerably more than 15 percent poverty that are ineligible because they are below the district average (Kennedy et al., 1986).

Kennedy et al. present extensive data that show these problems in another way. Using data from the Sustaining Effects Study (SES) they show that substantial numbers of children served by Chapter 1/Title I in fact are neither in poverty nor score in the bottom 50 percent of standardized achievement tests. They also show the other side of the coin--to wit that there are substantial numbers of poor and low-scoring children who are not served by the program. Using data gathered just on elementary school children, they estimate that Chapter 1 does <u>not</u> serve 68.6 percent of poor students, 64.9 percent of students achieving below the 25 percentile in achievement, 57.9 percent of poor <u>and</u> low-achieving students, and even 55.1 percent of poor and low-achieving students who are in Chapter 1 schools.[13]

These are not surprising figures when we consider the allocation mechanism for Chapter 1 funds. The distribution of funds to almost all LEAs and to over 70 percent of the elementary schools of the nation means that many affluent schools with relative high-scoring children receive Chapter 1 funding. Moreover, unless the appropriation level is dramatically increased, this distribution guarantees that the funds are spread hopelessly thin; programs in many of the poorest schools with very low-scoring children are far too small to serve even a major percentage of the needy students.

<u>What should be done to make Chapter 1 targeting more efficient</u>? A typical response to this question has been to advocate tightened fiscal accountability regulations on the distribution of funds within schools without changing the fundamental distribution system. This approach cannot succeed.

If funds continue to go to 14,000 LEAs and 70 percent of the elementary schools in the nation, no tightening of within school criteria will change the fact that many of those students deepest in poverty will never have a chance to receive Chapter 1 services while many relative affluent and high-scoring students will be served by the program.

The alternative seems clear from the data presented in the Kennedy et al. paper. To increase efficiency in the allocation of funds to the nation's neediest students the targeting must be improved. We must expand the level of allocation to schools with high concentrations of poverty students. To accomplish this in a time of constrained resources, funds must go to fewer LEAs and to fewer schools within the LEAs. The concentration of funds cannot be minor—to make a significant change in educational opportunity for our neediest children the resources brought to bear on the problems of schools in our inner-cities and poorest rural areas must be considerable. The final section of this paper suggests a practical approach to the targeting problem.[14]

What Services Should Be Offered by Chapter 1?

One aspect of the allocation system was not considered in the preceding section. I did not discuss how students within schools would be selected to participate in Chapter 1 programs. The reason is that this issue is intimately tied to the issue of services to be offered.

In the present system students within a school are identified as eligible to receive Chapter 1 services because they give evidence of low achievement through achievement tests and teacher judgment. In over 75 percent of Chapter 1 schools, students are "pulled out" of their regular classrooms to receive compensatory instruction. In upwards of 50 percent of Chapter 1 programs the students are actually pulled out of their regular reading or mathematics class and placed in another setting for their compensatory instruction in the same subject. The Peterson paper at this Conference offers a succinct critique of the pullout approach. She and others find that it has a number of inherent flaws that influence its effectiveness.[15] These include:

- Students are stigmatized by identification as a Chapter 1 students who need special attention. They are labeled as "slow," or "dumb," or worse, by other students, by their parents, by teachers, by themselves, and in their permanent records.

- The instructional program for these students is fragmented.[16] The regular and Chapter 1 staff are often physically and administratively separated in schools. They often use different textbooks and pedagogical strategies. For many Chapter 1 students, their "regular" teacher does not instruct them during the time when they are supposed to be learning one or more of the core subjects of elementary school (math or reading). Yet reading and mathematics are "taught" all day long by most effective elementary school teachers--in instances where a child is pulled out for reading or math the "regular" teacher has no way of knowing the child's needs. Across years there is fragmentation within the Chapter 1 program. Students who succeed in the program by improving their scores sufficiently are not allowed to stay in the program while others are newly placed in the program. A certain amount of this movement happens simply due the unreliability of the tests and the "regression to the mean" phenomenon.

- Pulling the student out removes the responsibility for the education of the student from the "regular" teacher. The fragmentation of responsibility makes it impossible to hold anyone accountable.

The reason that the pullout instructional model became the dominant approach in Chapter 1 stems from a record of early abuses of then Title I funds--funds were spent for activities and resources unrelated to the purposes of the program. To tighten accountability, Congress instituted a set of fiscal requirements in the late 60s and early 70s.[17] A substantial number of these requirements operate at the building level. They require the LEA to insure that Chapter 1 schools receive the level of resources from sources other than Chapter 1 that they would have received had there not been Chapter 1 and this level be at least comparable to the level received by non-Chapter 1 schools in the same LEA.

One fiscal requirement operates on the expenditure of resources within schools. This requirement is generally called the supplement- not-supplant provision. It is interpreted as stipulating that Chapter 1 funds cannot be used to pay for anything within the school that would otherwise be paid for by another source. A second provision, the excess-cost requirement, stipulates that Chapter 1 funds can only be used to pay for the excess cost of services used exclusively by Chapter 1 students. Thus, for example, Chapter 1 funds cannot be used for teacher inservice programs which include teachers who are not Chapter 1 teachers, nor can they be used to pay the salary of a teacher who teaches some non-Chapter 1 students, nor, for years, could they be used for Chapter 1 paid teachers to assist

regular teachers to oversee students in the halls or the playgrounds, if the duty included monitoring some non-Chapter 1 students.

In their attempt to implement this requirement, the U.S. Office of Education and state departments of education (SEAs) issued regulations, guidelines, and other non-regulatory guidance and provided technical assistance to LEAs to help them design delivery mechanisms which were legal. The dominant choice to create a "clean" fiscal trail was to create, in effect, a separate system within the school. Their goals were to keep the Chapter 1 teachers as separate as possible from the core program of the school, deliver Chapter 1 services in separate settings, and have separate technical assistance and reporting lines. By and large they succeeded.

Over the years, as Gaffney (1986) points out, there have been changes in the regulations and in the legislation which should influence the way that the fiscal requirements are interpreted. Existing Chapter 1 law (and Congressional language in the 1978 Amendments) even explicitly states that pullouts are not required by Chapter 1. And in 1981 Congress repealed the excess-cost amendment. Pullouts never were required, but the simple fact is that responsible people in state and local agencies believed that it was certainly the easiest, and to some the only, way to meet the law. The District Practices Study carried out in 1983 with Department of Education funds found that the central reasons given by district administrators for using a pullout design were that: (a) it was easier to demonstrate compliance with Chapter 1 accounting requirements (73 percent) and (b) that the State Chapter 1 office recommended its use (50 percent). Only 18 percent of district administrators who used a pullout design indicated they believed it was educationally superior to any other mode of delivery.

The primary alternative to pulling students out for Chapter 1 services is to deliver services within the classrooms. According to the District Practices Study a substantial number of districts (30 percent) report using this design often as well as the pullout model. Gaffney discusses this Chapter 1 option in his analysis of the flexibility of the regulations. In a related paper presented at this Conference, Archambault (1986)[18] considers the evidence of in-class Chapter 1 practices and concludes that in-class strategies also suffer from problems of stigmatization and fragmentation. Although many find this surprising, the reasons seem obvious on reflection. The Chapter 1 fiscal trail also reaches into the regular classroom to influence instructional strategy. Within classroom approaches require that children be identified and that separate instruction be administered, generally by Chapter 1 teachers rather than the regular teachers. The forces to

label, to reduce the continuity and organization of instruction, and to relieve the regular teacher of responsibility for the outcomes operate in this model just as in the pullout model. And the same restrictions on whole school activities such as inservice training to coordinate instruction apply for the within classroom models.

There is little wonder that data indicate, on average, (a) that Chapter 1 has little short-term and no sustaining effects and (b) that there is little systematic difference in the effectiveness of pullout and in-class models.[19] Because both models suffer from clear shortcomings, it is not surprising that Archambault concluded that instructional setting does little to determine the effectiveness of Chapter 1 programs. It seems clear that it is not useful to continue research that contrasts in-class and pullout instructional models in Chapter 1, each of which is required to identify and instruct children separately. So long as the supplement-not-supplant provision operates in Chapter 1, research directed at improving compensatory education, as Archambault insists, should be on the content and instructional strategies used in the Chapter 1 programs.[20]

Can anything be done to overcome the problems created by the fiscal tracking of funds down to the level of the student? Suppose that the supplement-not-supplant provision did not exist.[21] Suppose that in Chapter 1 schools there were no specific students identified as eligible for Chapter 1 and, instead, all students in the school were seen as "at risk" academically. Under this approach funds from Chapter 1 could be used to upgrade the quality of the entire school. Following the discussion of effective teaching strategies in Peterson and the extensive research on effective schools, the Chapter 1 funds could be employed in ways that have a substantial backing in the literature.[22] Chapter 1 funds could be used to lower class size, to assist teachers in improving the curriculum of the school, to provide school-wide inservice training, and to establish constructive programs with students' parents. Following the guide of the literature, the teachers and administrators within the schools could be responsible for the development of strategies to maximize the achievement of the neediest students. This would give the entire staff control over the nature and content of the instructional program, a condition which is related to the efficacy of the staff and hence to the effectiveness of the program (Good & Brophy, 1986; Purkey & Smith, 1983).[23]

This is not a new proposal. Three sets of arguments are generally raised to respond to it. The first is that by spreading the Chapter 1 funds throughout the school they would be too diluted to have much effect. After all, in many Chapter 1 schools there are not many poor and low-achieving students

and, if the little Chapter 1 funds received by the school are not targeted to the level of the child, they will not be useful. One part of the answer to this argument is that Chapter 1 funds should only go to schools with high densities of poverty children for all of the reasons given in the early part of this paper. In schools with very high densities of poverty children all of the children are at risk. The percentage of long-term poverty children is high in these schools. And the percentage of very low-achieving students is greater than would be expected on the basis of the poverty percentage itself. Moreover, substantial numbers of children will be at the margin on achievement measures; in schools with fewer problems and greater resources these students might accomplish far more. It makes great sense to approach the overall problems and quality of schools of this sort rather than to fund programs of dubious value that are deliberately on the margins of the school.[24]

A second part of the answer is that schools with high densities of poor children should receive substantial levels of Chapter 1 funds; the funds should not be thinly spread. For example, a 1,000-student elementary school with 40 percent poverty might receive an allocation of $200,000 ($500/student for 400 students). Such a school might have a staff of 40. A Chapter 1 allocation of this magnitude might be used to reduce class size in the early grades by 3-4 students, and to put the entire staff through an intensive summer workshop on ways of improving their curriculum and teaching, and to purchase new materials to aid teachers in teaching problem solving and critical thinking, and to pay for a part-time coordinator to encourage parents to work with their children, and other programs. The point is that the overall quality of the school, its climate, curriculum, relationships with parents, and the expectations of its teachers could be influenced by Chapter 1 if the funds were targeted to high poverty schools and used to influence the program of the entire school.[25]

A second argument used against this proposal is that accountability is lost if the dollars are not tracked and that the funds will be spent on frivolous things unrelated to the needs of the poor and low-achieving students. There are two ways of addressing this important issue. The first is to shift the discussion of accountability from resources to outcomes. At the present time the central way that we know that Chapter 1 is aiding poor and low-scoring students is to follow the dollar trail so that we are able to identify specific services paid for by Chapter 1 that are received by prespecified children. Although there are often carefully carried out evaluations of Chapter 1 programs, the local school or the local school system are not held accountable if the results of the evaluations are negative.[26] They are only held accountable if the funds are not spent in the prescribed fashions to meet the fiscal

requirements. The alternative is to require in Chapter 1 that the local school and the LEA establish a set of outcome goals that are monitored by the state education agency and, perhaps, ultimately, by the Federal government. At the elementary school level these goals would be expressed in terms of reading and mathematics test achievement gains for the entire school and for the lowest scoring in the school.[27] At the middle and secondary level achievement and attainment goals might be established. The key is that they are school-wide goals involving the effort of all of the teachers and other staff within the schools. Within boundaries the teachers and staff of the school would be responsible for setting the goals.

But so what, you say. Suppose that goals are set and then not met. Where is the exercise of accountability? Wouldn't we be in the same situation as we are presently, without a means for exercising any clout? This leads to the second way of addressing the accountability problem. It would have four parts:

a. Schools would be expected to establish school-wide outcome goals (within certain constraints established by legislation). The goals would cover a three- to five-year period.

b. The school staff would develop a school- wide instructional plan to reach the goals which would be reviewed and approved by the SEA.

c. Outcome assessments would be carried out by the LEA on a yearly basis and reported to the SEA and to the public. As part of its application for Chapter 1 funds the LEA would be expected to establish incentives for schools which reach their goals.

d. If, after three years, the school was not reaching its goals, it would be required to modify its instructional plan in a significant fashion. If after a second three-year period the goals were still not being met, the LEA would be required to go the SEA with a new plan to change the administrative and instructional staff and pedagogy of the school so that it met the needs of its students.

There are lots of other possible schemes for insuring some accountability. This particular one has three desirable components: outcome goals and plans developed by the staff for achieving the goals; incentives for reaching the goals; and a graduated set of procedures for improving the school if the goals were not met.

The third argument that will be used against this approach has a variety of components: one is that we have no assurance that it will "work"; another is that it will eliminate lots of good existing programs; and still another is that it has already been tried in Chapter 1 legislation as an option and that local agencies did not make much use of it. This line of argument may have some truth to it in each component, and each should be addressed. First, certainly the new approach will not always work. But we do have substantial evidence referenced earlier and reviewed by Peterson and others at this Conference that suggests that it will "work" better than the present approach. The evidence is clear that the problems of the very poor and low-achieving must be seen as belonging to the entire school rather than only be the responsibility of the Chapter 1 teachers. The literature on school management, inservice training, discipline and order in the schools, the quality of the curriculum, and school climate and culture all point in the direction of establishing clear goals, high expectations, and whole school planning efforts engaged in by the entire staff (Purkey & Smith, 1983). Moreover, this approach gives a clear system for establishing accountability for the key unit that the central administration of a school system must deal with--the school itself. School administrators and teachers are given the authority to define their programs to meet the needs of the poor and low-achieving and, simultaneously, held accountable for meeting student outcome goals to which they have agreed.

The second part of this criticism is that there would be lots of disruption and many good existing programs would be destroyed. There seem to me to be three responses. First, without question there would be disruption both in communities and schools that would lose Chapter 1 funding because of more efficient targeting and in communities and schools where the programs would be enhanced. But productive change always entails some disruption. If this kind of disruption looms large even in the face of the evidence about the lack of efficiency and effectiveness of the program, we will never improve the education of the very poor in the nation. Second, though some strong programs will no longer receive funding, on the basis of the evidence there would be as many or more weak programs put in jeopardy and overall there will be a net gain. Third, it would be reasonable to let some of the present strong programs continue to exist in schools that continue to receive funding <u>if</u> the schools met the other conditions of developing a systematic set of goals and plans.

The third part of the argument is that the approach has already been tried in Chapter 1 and was neither successful or widely tried by local schools. It is accurate that an approach of this sort was put into legislation in 1978 and subsequently tried by a number of school districts. The reasons for the few

attempts by local districts to try the approach, however, is probably not because they disliked it. Rather the Federal legislation was far too restrictive and costly for the local agencies to carry out broad implementation. The legislation carried two major disincentives, a requirement that at least 75 percent of the students be in poverty and a requirement that the LEA augment the amount of money that Chapter 1 provided by a substantial amount over and beyond the normal LEA allocation to the school. Yet even though the nation was entering economic hard times in 1979 and 1980 when this provision came into effect, a number of communities tried to implement the provision. In his paper for this Conference, Archambault mentions the experiences in Los Angeles and Austin where programs had to eventually be terminated because of cost. In Austin, the program was much more effective than a pullout model; students in the school-wide programs gained an average of 2.5 months more in language arts, 2.1 months more in reading, and 2.2 months more in mathematics over a one-year program.

There is little question but that the cost per school would be greater in a whole school strategy. There would also be a smaller number of schools because of better targeting. The question for policy makers is whether they are willing to give up the broad based program touching all of the LEAs and a large majority of the elementary schools and challenge the conventional approach to delivering instruction in return for an approach that has some substantial promise of improving the education of the very poor.

Summary of Proposal for ECIA, Chapter 1

In general, retain the present purposes and Federal/state/local structure for Chapter 1 but propose major, realistic amendments to within that structure to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the program.

1. Efficiency: Improve the targeting of funds. Target funds only to local education agencies with high concentrations of poverty and to schools within them with very high percentages of poverty children. These schools are primarily in inner-cities and poor rural areas.

   Rationale: Poor students who attend high poverty schools are doubly disadvantaged. Data indicate that their families and schools are less able to help them achieve than are well-to-do families and schools with affluent populations. At present, Chapter 1 funds are spread out to over 95 percent of America's 14,000

LEAs and over 70 percent of our elementary schools. Low-scoring students in affluent communities have multiple opportunities outside of Chapter 1 to receive special attention. Thousands of much less fortunate schools in inner-cities have far higher poverty levels, far lower achievement levels, and far fewer resources and are not served by Chapter 1 because the funds are inefficiently distributed.

2. Effectiveness: Let good educational practice rather than accounting practice shape Chapter 1 programs. In schools with high levels of poverty (say twice the national average), let the fiscal trail for Chapter 1 funds stop at the school building door and the funds be used to upgrade the quality of the entire school. For these schools, waive the supplement-not-supplant requirement in Chapter 1. In return for the waiver the school should be required to meet an accountability provision (see below).

   Rationale: At the present time children are identified within school buildings as being in Chapter 1 and, generally, are pulled out of their regular classroom for "supplemental" instruction. In many instances they are pulled out of reading or math classes to be given reading or math instruction by a Chapter 1 teacher. If they are not pulled out they are identified within their classroom as eligible for compensatory services. This form of program stigmatizes the child, leads to a lack of coordination within the school, and, according to the best available data, has no sustained positive effect on the achievement of the student. Considerable recent evidence on effective schools indicates that we know a lot about ways of improving achievement that would be appropriate if the funds were available for use in the whole school.

3. Effectiveness: Establish systems of output accountability for Chapter 1 schools. Develop incentives for schools that work toward specific goals.

   Rationale: At present, there is no accountability system and there are no incentives for superior performance in Chapter 1. Schools receiving Chapter 1 funds should be required to establish clear goals and plans relating to improved academic outcomes and then be rewarded if the goals are reached. (Presently, if a school is too successful it loses its Chapter 1 funds.) If schools are not successful in attaining their goals they would have to modify their plans in a significant fashion; if they are not

successful for back-to-back three-year periods the LEA would be required to take specific action or lose funds. Care must be taken to stimulate achievement goals that are not too narrow or too tied to a particular test. The key should be to challenge students with a greater range and depth of content. Recent evidence indicates that low-income and minority students in high poverty areas receive such a watered down curriculum that they are guaranteed to fail.

4. Efficiency and Effectiveness: Encourage Chapter 1 funding of middle and secondary schools. Establish incentives for low- income students to graduate, perhaps by using school-business partnerships.

Rationale: At present almost all of the Chapter 1 funds are used at the elementary school level. If funds were more tightly targeted to very high poverty schools, some funds would be available for especially needy schools beyond the elementary level. The outcome goals for these schools could include lowering the dropout rates as well as raising achievement. Information about student dropouts indicates that they often believe that there is no incentive for staying in school. If Chapter 1 funds were directed toward improving the entire school, they could be used to work with the local business community to establish incentives such as guaranteed jobs for graduates, as well as for efforts to improve the school curriculum and for tutorial programs.

Endnotes

1. See Kortex (1986) for a recent and interesting overall discussion of changes in achievement test scores over the past few decades. Koretz examines test score changes by birth cohort, an approach which leads to a different set of conclusions than those reached by other analysts.

2. See the Teachers College Record 87 (1986); the entire volume deals with the dropout isue. Also see Levin (1986).

3. Also see publications from the Boston Compact, Boston School Department, and the July 6, 1986, New York Times article on the efforts that Boston and New York City are making to give students a clear incentive for graduating from high school.

4. One source of evidence comes from the effective schools literature. See, for example, Purkey and Smith (1983). Another literature has to do with the relationship between life chances and educational attainment. See Jencks et al. (1981).

5. One way in which the desire to maintain the status quo is expressed is by reference to the "legal framework"—a constructed, internally consistent system of rules and regulations which is argued by its advocates to be inseparable from the intent of program itself. Thus, the justification goes, if the logic of the system of rules and regulations is violated, the violator must have values that are antithetical to the purposes of the program. Michael J. Gaffney's paper for this conference, "Chapter 1: The Choices for Educators," is an example of this tradition. Gaffney describes the "legal framework" for the program and argues that the legislation and regulations both insure that the program meets legislative intent and give great freedom to the local school system. As a variety of people at the Conference pointed out, the paper ignores existing knowledge about program implementation and the damaging effects of misunderstood and externally imposed regulations on the quality of services in reaching its benign conclusions about the real and potential effects of the legislative, regulatory, and sub-regulatory (administrative) guidelines. Gaffney supplies a careful critique of a set of three substantive papers in his session of the Conference. The touchstone for his critique, however, is always the existing "legal framework" ("These proposals [for school-wide staff development] must be assessed in light of the legal framework." [emphasis added]) rather than the potential

positive effect of such proposals for the achievement of poor and low-achieving students. There is an eerie sense of "natural order" here. Gaffney's paper and its references are useful for students of the regulatory structure of Chapter 1 and its predecessor, Title I. The discussion in this section of this paper of the ways that funds are presently allocated in the Chapter 1 may be augmented by the Gaffney paper.

6. These quotes are taken directly from Sec. 101 of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 as reported in "A Report onthe Education Amendments of 1978," H. R. 15, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 95-1137, May 11, 1978.

7. See the Kennedy et al. (1986) and the Gaffney (1986) papers for more detail and for references which supply more detail. The focus here is on the allocation of funds in the general compensatory education program. This discussion does not deal with the special programs for migrants and the handicapped.

8. This description is generally right. For a precise description see the Chapter 1 legislation.

9. The LEA has some options based on provisions in the regulations--for example, funding must go to schools in order of poverty intensity in the schools but if there is very low achievement in a particular school the order may be changed. Overall, however, the basic provisions listed in the text dominate the selection process. See the Kennedy et al. (1986) paper, the papers from the first National Institute of Education Title I study which are referenced in the Kennedy et al. paper and the paper by Gaffney (1986) prepared for this conference.

10. In keeping with one role of this paper (as a critique of the major papers of the session) I have a variety of methodological quibbles with the Kennedy et al. paper though I agree with the general conclusions. Bill Cooley (1986) cited a number of criticisms in his discussion of the papers at the Conference. Especially important are his points regarding the effect on correlations of changing the unit of analysis from the individual to the school. On the general issue of the relationship between poverty and achievement, the argument in the Kennedy et al. paper about which of the measures of social status has the strongest relationship to achievement is not useful. The different relationships depend on many things, including how the independent variables are defined, the variation in the population, and the age and grades of the students. The K. R. White paper (1982) is misleading at

best on these issues. It is difficult to judge some of the other methodological issues in the Kennedy et al. paper since its methodological section (Appendix D) was not attached to the paper.

11. See Kennedy et al. (1986) for more detail on these issues.

12. There is a concentration provision in Chapter 1 that would allow funds to be targeted to the 50 percent or so of the "poorest" counties in the nation. The provision was advocated by the Carter administration and passed by Congress in the 1978 Amendments to Title I of ESEA. The logic behind the development of the provision was similar to the logic of this paper's discussion of the issue, though Carter's analysts did not have the benefit of the kind of analysis that Kennedy et al. have carried out in their paper. The concentration provision can be used only for "new" money (above a current appropriation) and has not proved popular at appropriations time in Congress; it contains less than 10 percent of the Chapter 1 funding for the basic program.

13. The Sustaining Effects Study (SES) data were gathered in 1976 but there is little reason to suspect that the numbers have changed since then. Again I have methodological quibbles with the Kennedy et al. analyses though I agree with their general conclusions. It would be useful for them to estimate the impact of measurement unreliability on their assessments of assignment in Title I. There are at least three sources of measurement error that confound their analyses: error in the original tests used for assignment; error in the SES-administered tests; error in the measure used to assess poverty in the SES.

14. This position can be supported by a relatively conservative view of the Federal role in education. The argument would go something like the following:

    - o States have a responsibility to provide a high quality general education to all of their students. The Federal role should be marginal.

    - o Because of problems of the national economy and historical accident which transcend state policies, some states and localities within states have particularly high populations of students from poor families.

    - o As long as we evaluate students' achievement with measuring instruments that differentiate among and rank them, some will achieve relatively well and some relatively badly.

- o Students from poor families, especially those in high poverty communities and schools, are very likely to achieve at a low level on our measuring instruments. Because the problems are so great in these schools, these students will receive less assistance and, therefore, less high quality education than both affluent and poor children in low poverty communities and schools.

- o The Federal government has a responsibility from a variety of legislative acts to promote equal educational opportunity.

- o A compensatory education program targeted on the highest poverty schools in the nation would be focussed clearly on an extraordinary and marginal role directed at meeting a national need that states may not have the resources to meet.

15. Other authors making the same kinds of arguments are Glass and Smith (1977), Archambault (1986), Smith (1984), Kaestle and Smith (1982), and Kimbrough and Hill (1981).

16. Peterson (1986) has a thoughtful discussion of the fragmentation issue on pages II-24 through II-28 of her paper for this Conference. She sees the problem as especially acute for low-achieving students and finds that pullouts may lead to a fragmentation of content and to less emphasis on teaching higher-order skills.

17. The evolution of these requirements is recounted in the Gaffney (1986) paper presented at this Conference and in its references. See also Kaestle and Smith (1982).

18. This is an interesting and comprehensive review of the literature on instructional settings in Chapter 1.

19. The SES data cited earlier provide the overall evidence of effectiveness. A recent article summarizing these data is Carter (1984). The Archambault paper (1986) also reviews some of this literature. One legitimate question might be about why Chapter 1 has any short-term effect at all given the criticisms mounted against it. There are two answers: The first is that both settings, on average, probably provide a somewhat more intensive instructional setting than does the regular classroom which has not received any extra resources; the second is that a lot of the instructional content of Chapter 1 programs is oriented toward the short-term goal of increasing test scores. As Peterson (1986) suggests this second orientation may distort the instructional programs away from important

longer term goals having to do, for example, with comprehension in reading and problem solving in mathematics.

20. In a provocative paper presented at the Conference, Don Moore (1986) contrasted the degree of coordination and the nature of the fragmentation of the curriculum in Chapter 1 and non-Chapter 1 schools and found that there was little difference. In effect, he found that Chapter 1 did not contribute to a generally low level of coordination and a high level of fragmentation. One conclusion from his presentation is that it doesn't matter whether the Chapter 1 program has a supplement-not-supplant requirement, for no matter what happens the curriculum will be uncoordinated and fragmented. Another conclusion is that it will take a great deal of effort to improve the schools and, while removing the impediments to coordination created by Chapter 1, it will not solve all of the problems, but it might be one place to start. Many of Moore's comments were based on his experiences in Chicago which may have less coordinated and more fragmented schools than some other communities.

21. There would continue to be fiscal requirements if this strategy were adopted. "Comparability," which requires that Chapter 1 schools receive at least the same levels of resources from other sources as do non-Chapter 1 schools, would be maintained. And "maintenance of effort," which requires that Chapter 1 schools receive at least the same level of resources as they did in prior years, would also be maintained.

22. Peterson's conference paper (1986) reviews much of the literature on effective strategies for instruction and some of the literature on effective schools. For more extensive reviews of the literature on effective schools, see Purkey and Smith (1983) and Good and Brophy (1986). For a more extensive review of the teaching literature see Brophy and Good (1986).

23. Much of this literature focuses on the importance of the environment of the school and the level of expectation of the faculty for the achievement of students.

24. Politically, it may be impossible to fund only the very neediest schools. If schools with small percentages of poverty and low-scoring children which receive few resources continued to be funded by Chapter 1, it would be prudent to allow programs targeted toward low-achieving students. Perhaps a cutoff of 40 percent poverty in the school would be reasonable: above that level (which is double the national average) the program would be schoolwide; below that level other approaches which would entail

targeting students would be used. It is not obvious to me that, even in the lower poverty schools, the rigidities of the supplement-not-supplant requirements are the only way of ensuring that the purposes of Chapter 1 are met.

25. See Kennedy et al. (1986) for a discussion of the poverty-achievement relationship. See Purkey and Smith (1986) and Good and Brophy (1986) for discussions of the importance of school-based approaches. See Peterson (1986) for a discussion of the importance of higher order and critical thinking skills and their absence from the Chapter 1 curriculum. The figure $500 is not arbitrary; it is approximately what is spent in Chapter 1 programs on each Chapter 1 child. The 40 percent poverty figure is not unusually high for most inner-city and poor rural area schools.

26. Local education agencies are urged to use the results of the evaluations to help improve their Chapter 1 programs, but again they are not held accountable for a failure either to perform well or to engage in active improvement.

27. A very important consideration here would be to ensure that local schools and LEAs did not choose too narrow a set of achievement measures and that at least the forms of the measures changed from year to year so that the teachers did not focus on instruction designed solely to improve student scores on a particular test. In my view the schools and LEAs should be accountable for outcome results at one time during the elementary years, the end of fifth grade. For students to do well on most standardized tests at the end of fifth grade in reading and mathematics, they need a firm and fairly broad grounding in basic and problem solving skills. They need to be able to read and comprehend text beyond simple sentences and paragraphs, to gather information in context areas from textbooks while working alone, to draw and make inferences from text, to carry out the basic arithmetic operations and to solve word problems in mathematics that require selecting and accurately using the right arithmetic operation. The LEAs should and generally do require lots of other tests at earlier grade levels to monitor progress. At the middle and secondary levels similar kinds of standards could be defined.

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